Lord Palmerstons Achievements as Foreign Secretary

shaper Palmerstons Achievements as Foreign SecretaryAssess the accomplishment of Palmerstons first period at the Foreign Office, between 1830 and 1841.Viscount Palmerston was, without doubt, one of the most famous foreign secretaries ever to take aim held the office- and he did so on 2 occasions- between 1830-41, and 1846-52. As with many famous figures he is also rather a controversial one, receiving a mixture of praise and criticism from historians. Anthony Wood broadly run intos him as a dextrous negotiator, who threatened to use force in a judicious and responsible manner1. Eric Evans, on the other hand, is more inclined to see Palmerstons obvious sabre rattling and Gun Boat diplomacy as an irresponsible and unprincipled pursuit of the National enkindle2 that aggravated diplomatic wounds (especially with the french) and left hand skipper Aberdeen (when he took over in 1841) to pick up the pieces3. The function of this essay will be to evaluate Palmertons achievements i n the first (and mayhap more influential) period nether the premierships of Earl Grey and Lord Melborne in light of this historiographical debate.This essay will adopt a chronological structure to facilitate the clearness of discussion. It will cover the three most famous events in British Foreign affairs in this period- the Belgium Crisis of 1830-1, the creation of the Quadruple Alliance in 1834, the at long last the Egyptian Crises concerning France and Russia from 1831-41. It will then assess if, on balance, Palemerstons first period at the Foreign Office can generally be called a success, as argued by Wood, or in fact did more harm than good- as argued by Evans.Palmerstons general attitude to foreign affairs was respl turn backently one of the pursuit of national self-interest above the maintenance of any kind of consistent, or ethical position. He told the House of CommonsWe have no eternal allies, we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and th ose interests it is our duty to followFor Evans, this was attitude represented a carte blance form of pragmatism. Palmerston was able to intertwine himself in the union jack- often mobilising British public opinion behind him- and effectively conduct himself as he pleased with little regard for the reign or stability of other nations- and most importantly- without any regard for long term-worsening of diplomatic relations.This approach was first demonstrated in respect of the Crisis in Belgium in 1830-1. In the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Belgium had been placed under the United Provinces of the Dutch- ignoring the obvious differences in religion and national feeling4. Eventually, Belgium Patriots were able to gather enough harbour to drive out the Dutch garrison from Brussels. King Louis Phillipe, who had come to power in France in 1830, was kn make to favour a satellite Belgium state under a French protectorate- although it was unknown as the extent the French were prepared to u se military force to get it. At a London host in 1831, Palmerston found himself in a difficult position- but refused to hand over two fortresses on the Belgium border to the French- thus ensuring the creation of a deaf(p) Belgium. Some months later, after the French posted troops inside Belgium, Palmerston let it be known that he would be prepared to use force against them if they did non withdraw5. The French could non take this risk, and retreated. A treaty was pressed in December 1832, establishing an international guarantee of Belgiums neutrality.On the face of it, this seemed like a triumph for Palmeston. It could be argued that he had played the game of diplomatic bluff to perfection, and by refusing to assent to French demands and sabre rattling, had achieved a settlement most inkeeping with his refinement of maintaining British national interest- and one which ensured a potencely dangerous French power-base did not grow any more menacing. However, there was no doubt th at Lord Pumicestones abrasive qualities had soured Anglo-French relations and by chance a more delicate and consensual stance might have yielded a more all right outcome to all sidesThe diplomatic problems with France did not go away. In 1834, the Queens of Spain and Portugal (who were constitutional rulers) were threatened by absolutist regimes in their own countries- and Palmerston was suspicious that the French planned to take advantage. His idea to create a Quadruple Alliance between all four countries seemed, on the face of it, another great success. France could not diplomatically refuse an alliance already agreed to by Britain, Spain, and Portugal6, and was manifestly once again outmanoeuvred by what Palmerston called a Capital Hit all of my own doing (He was not known for his modesty). Palmerston had always been unequivocal in his support for Constitutional rulers, and Britains self-interest was arguably sustained by the maintenance of moderate regimes in the Iberian Pen insula7. On this occasion, he had arguably used diplomatic guile rather than the implied threat of military force to achieve success- so it can perhaps be said that Palmerston was occasionally prepared to dock his gunboat for a spot of peaceful diplomacy. Once again, though, the price of safeguarding British Interests had worsened Anglo-French relations.In 1831, Mehemet Ali, a ungovernable vassal of the Turkish Sultan Mahmud in Egypt, declared war and took possession of Palestine and Syria from the Turkish Empire. The Russians- in offering to help forced the beleaguered Sultan to sign a rough treaty which effectively passed control of the strategically vital Unkiar Skelessi Straits to them. Palmerston was worried about an escalation of Russian influence- as it heightened his fear of a potential alliance between Russia and France. In 1839, the Sultan made an ill-advised attack on Ali, and ended up suffering an ignominious defeat, and gave the vassal his excuse to assoil the war de ep into Turkish territory. It was Palmerstons indemnity to support Turkey, mainly because it dispersed the power base of europium, and also because of a recently signed commercialized treaty between the two nations. The Turkish town of Aden (which had the added benefit of being a useful place for British steamships to replenish their coal stocks en dispatch to India) was placed under a British protectorate. Rather predictably, the French sided with Mehemet Ali. Palmerston offered a deal to his enemies- that Ali could retain Egypt and Syria for his lifetime, but the French encouraged him to turn it down. Palmerston refused to climb down, and instructed Lord Granville (the British Ambassador in Paris) toCovey to him (King Louis Phillipe) in the most friendly and unoffensive manner possiblethat if France begins a war, she will lose her ships, colonies and commerce before she sees the end of it that her army of Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will be chu cked into the Nile8This uncompromising stance once again was a gamble, made more intense when British Marines helped capture the cities of Acre and Beirut after Ali rejected Palmerstons deal. France (also worried by threatening movements in Bavaria) was in no position to engage Britain in a war, and she ended up having to aid Britain and Russia to defeat Ali9. Eventually, Russia was even persuaded to relinquish control of the Straits, and all four powers agreed to return to the original settlement of 180910. Disaster had seemingly been diverted again by Palmerstons tough diplomatic line. For Wood, he had read Frances hand perfectly11, and once again maintained peace, even if (for Evans) he had put several noses out of joint with more Gun Boat Diplomacy12.In Conclusion, this essay has shown that Palmerstons abrasive approach to Foreign policy was generally a great success. In each of the three instances covered, his reluctance to compromise worked in Britains interests, and against t hose of France- her eternal foe. Undoubtedly, he did prioritise the national interest above all else, but it could be argued that- such was Britains dominance- that her interests and the goal of stability and peace in Europe were by no means unrelated. In fact, one could argue from this evidence that they were very closely linked, and that maybe Palmerstons reputation as irresponsible is slightly unfounded.It can be said that Palmerstons hands-on and confrontational approach was extremely risky, and that there was a large element of luck involved in achieving a successful outcome on each occasion. For example, had France not withdrawn from Belgium in 1831, a bloody war might have ensured. In 1839, it may only have been the sudden sexual climax of threatening activity in Prussia that made the French swallow their pride, and abandon Mehemet Ali. Palmerston was also aided by his fleet of gunboats that backed up everything he said. Britains naval dominance at that time allowed him to a dopt a far more hard-line and interventionist approach than many other Foreign Secretaries before or since. Overall, Palmerstons guile- backed up by his luck and his powerbase made his period at the Foreign Office between 1830-41 extremely successful, but arguably it could have easily gone horribly wrong.BibliographyWood, A, Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office 1830-41 in Nineteenth Century Britain , 1960, LongmanDroz, J, Europe between Revolutions 1815-48, 1967, Fontana/CollinsEvans, E, Influence without entanglement Foreign Affairs, 1815-46 in The Forging of the Modern sound out 1783-1870, 1983, LongmanFelling, K, A History of England, 1973, Book Club AssociatesRoberts, J, A History of Europe, 1996, Helicon PublishingWord-Count- 16201Footnotes1 name Wood, Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office 1830-41 in Nineteenth Century Britain , 1960, pp.156-632 See Evans, Influence without Entanglement Foreign Affairs, 1815-46 in The Forging of the Modern State 1783-1870, 1983, pp.210-33 ibid, p.2114 Wood, pp.157-85 In a letter to Granville, he wrote The French must go out of Belgium or we have a general War. See Wood, p. 1596 Droz, Europe between Revolutions 1815-48, 1967, p.2367 Evans, p.2118 See Evans p. 211, also Wood, p.1579 Felling, A History of England, 1973, p. 85610 Wood, p.16311 ibid12 Evans, p.211